Chris Lawrence is no stranger to navigating volatile markets. The founder and managing partner of Labyrinth Capital Partners launched his firm just 45 days before COVID-19 disrupted the world – and private markets. But that timing is just one chapter in a career built on finding value in complexity.
With deep roots in secondaries, over a decade of global deal experience, and a sharpened focus on what he calls the “GP-Led+” strategy, Lawrence has carved out a differentiated path in the $5 million to $50 million corner of the private equity secondaries market. In this wide-ranging Q&A, he reflects on the road to founding Labyrinth, explains why GP-Led+ offers better risk-adjusted returns, and outlines his vision for the future of the firm.
Chris Lawrence’s Background
What is Chris Lawrence’s background? Lawrence said:
“I started Labyrinth Capital Partners 45 days before COVID hit. Real fun timing, but the roots go back a long way. I came out of SMU with an accounting degree, started at Arthur Andersen doing audit, bankruptcy, and moved to the corporate finance advisory business. I received my MBA at Columbia, which brought me to New York, and eventually settled in Greenwich when my kids were born.”
“Following Columbia, I joined an early-stage venture capital firm and moved into an operating role as effectively the CFO/COO for a software startup that went from a whiteboard discussion to raising $20 million before 9/11 and WorldCom’s blowup that cratered the telecom markets. While a great operational experience, I moved on and spent a few years doing private equity triage work for a multi-family office out of Florida, which led me into secondaries. I joined HQ Capital in 2008, six months before the global financial crisis hit. Again, great timing as a buyer, but not for raising capital.”
“At my prior firm, I helped restart and eventually co-led the global secondaries platform within its existing global FoF platform. Over 11 years, we raised and deployed globally (US, EU, Asia) over $1.8 billion representing over 180+ deals in our secondary strategy. I served on HQ’s Executive Committee and its Private Equity Investment Committee overseeing Primary, Coinvest, and Secondary investments. However, my day job was to invest in the global secondaries market while also working with my colleagues to secure new institutional investors in Europe, MENA, and Asia. Our investment team expanded to over 28 across the globe.”
“By 2018, HQ’s control shareholder (a very large well-known EU family) was going through a generational leadership transition, and I was unable to spin out the secondary strategy from HQ, so I left to found Labyrinth.”
“Labyrinth is a continuation of part of the strategy we implemented at my prior firm where we invested over $600 million in a niche part of the non-LP secondary market, or what we refer to as the ‘GP-Led+’ market today. We made one pivot from HQ, which is to be more patient on our hold periods with results being focused more on money multiple than IRR while still paying strict attention to downside protection.”
“GP-Led+ is a term we developed at Labyrinth to further clarify our strategy. As most investors know, GP-Led deals are made up of three transaction techniques: continuation vehicles, strip sales, and fund restructurings. While they have garnered significant press in recent years, these acquisition techniques have been around for close to 20 years. I executed my first GP-Led deal in 2010. In addition to the GP-Led deal types, we also focus on direct secondaries and hybrids which we classify as deals with a mix of primary and secondary, hence the ‘+’ in that we do more than just GP-Leds which gives investors better portfolio diversity through the types of deals and number of underlying companies in our target portfolio.”
“I am very excited about what we have accomplished here at Labyrinth even though the markets have been less than hospitable given COVID and the recent lack of DPI for fundraising. Having Tony LaRose and Cameron Lee as part of the team since 2020 has made it worth the journey. They are an integral part of the firm, and I look forward to watching them excel in the years to come.”
“That’s the background. It’s been a long road—but the opportunity ahead is bigger than ever.”
More About GP-Led
What do you mean by GP-Led+ and why is it potentially a better option than a pure GP-Led strategy? Lawrence replied:
“There’s been no shortage of coverage around GP-leds in recent years—and rightfully so. These transactions help solve for liquidity in private markets, especially when portfolio management needs diverge between GPs and LPs.”
“For context, ‘GP-led’ refers to three core transaction types initiated by general partners—structures that have actually been around for 15+ years:
1.) Continuation Funds – A new SPV is formed to acquire one or more portfolio companies from an existing GP-led fund, giving liquidity to legacy LPs while letting others roll over. The GP continues managing the asset, typically under a new economic structure with existing or new investors (usually secondaries-focused firms).
2.) Strip Sales – The GP sells a slice of its positions in one or several companies—often a fixed percentage—to generate liquidity. It’s a clean asset sale with no strings attached.
3.) Fund Restructurings – This is a broader category and includes various structures, such as:
a.) NAV Loans secured against the fund’s portfolio, which can be used for LP distributions or portfolio reinvestment—offensive or defensive.
b.) Recaps or Annex Funds involving LPA amendments, new capital, and/or new LPs, often with preference rights. These require creativity and real negotiation to align all parties.”
“These three GP-led types are well-established and will remain foundational, especially continuation funds. But as the market matures, volume is skewing toward the upper end — $500+ million deals, intermediated, and overly homogenous.”
So where does the “+” come in? That’s Labyrinth’s angle.
“We’ve executed all three GP-led transaction types for over a decade. But we also specialize in two additional structures that offer more flexibility, better pricing, and often better risk-adjusted outcomes:
1.) Direct Secondaries – Straight purchases of private company shares, sometimes in small portfolios (“secondary directs”). We don’t chase unicorn common—our target is “top of the stack” securities: preferred, convertible, or structured equity with liquidation preference and information rights. We often invest alongside insiders (e.g., board members) to improve governance and oversight.
2.) Hybrids – Our term. These combine elements of primary and secondary. For example, we might like a company raising what’s expected to be its final institutional round, but we’re not just writing a primary check. Instead, we pair a purchase of existing shares (from an insider or early investor) with a participation in the new round—lowering our effective entry price and increasing alignment.”
GP-Led+ Better Than A Pure GP-Led
So why is GP-Led+ better than a pure GP-Led strategy? Lawrence explained:
“A few key reasons:
1.) Broader toolkit: We execute across five transaction types—not three—allowing us to be flexible in solving for liquidity and alignment.
2.) Portfolio construction: Our target is 40+ companies, not the 12–15 you typically see in single-asset GP-led funds. That creates more downside protection, like an LP-led fund but with structured alpha.
3.) Sourcing edge: We play in the $5 million to $50 million deal range—off-market, limited competition, where pricing and terms still matter. We don’t have to win by paying the most.
4.) Experience: We’ve been doing this for 15 years. We know how to find value, structure around risk, and avoid landmines. We don’t need board seats, but we do care deeply about governance and structure.
5.) Discipline: We’re not chasing marks. Our focus is 2.25x+ net MM—built on price, structure, and companies that can grow over a 2-5 year hold.
That’s what GP-Led+ means: More tools, more diversification, more ways to win—without relying on the same playbook everyone else is using.”
Evolution Of Labyrinth Capital Partners’ Thesis
How has Labyrinth Capital Partners’ thesis evolved over time? Lawrence noted:
“Labyrinth’s thesis has stayed remarkably consistent—with the only pivot noted above about more patient hold periods given what I learned at HQ. The markets continue to exhibit only tailwinds given that our investment supply is purely a function of private market AUM which, according to McKinsey, has grown over 14% per year since 2013 to reach $13 trillion in the first half 2024. Even though we do more than just the three transaction types in GP-Led deals, the GP-Led market itself is growing over 29% per year since 2013, indicating that the practice of utilizing various liquidity solutions is becoming more mainstream.”
“When I launched Labyrinth in early 2020, the core idea was clear: there is still a massive, underserved segment of the secondary market—in the $5–$50M deal size range—where value is hiding in plain sight. These are complex deals that require real work: continuation vehicles with hair, strip sales, fund restructurings, and hybrid deals all generally similar to Growth/Buyout Risk companies, but with the potential for better pricing and related structuring to enhance both money multiple and downside protection.”
“At my prior firm, we proved the model worked. We deployed $1.8+ billion globally across 180+ deals, and over $600 million of that was in these GP-led-style transactions—before they were called GP-leds. We just didn’t call it a pure “strategy” back then as it was part of the portfolio construction for a majority LP-Led fund (similar to many of the main line secondary funds today). At Labyrinth, we made it the entire playbook.”
“So, what’s changed specifically?
From 2013 to 2024, GP-led volume exploded—$5 billion to $70+ billion. But that growth was mostly in the upper tiers: $500+ million deals, heavily intermediated, well-known GPs, scaled assets, short durations. That’s not where we play. We stuck to our thesis at the smaller end, where complexity creates mispricing, and where intermediaries aren’t crowding the field. Think $10-$20M SPVs, negotiated directly with GPs, management teams, and insiders.”
“Over time, we refined the model: More structure—we layered in fixed fund terms, consent rights, high GP hurdles, and preferred return waterfalls to protect downside. More triangulation—sourcing got more surgical; fewer auctions, more direct deals from our network of insiders, GPs, and board members. More flexibility—Hybrid deals emerged; structured equity with primary growth capital attached. LPs like the asymmetric return profile. Understanding the importance of portfolio construction as a means to provide investors downside protection with diversity by not only industry, but also in the number of companies. Our focus is to have over 3x the number of companies in our portfolio than what you may find in a larger GP-Led only fund.”
“The results? 10 deals closed, 13 companies in the portfolio, TVPI holding strong at 1.3x with an average portfolio age of ~24 months. And more importantly, zero reliance on the mega-deal ‘spray and pray’ model.”
“What hasn’t changed is the core: Price matters; structure matters; alignment matters; work wins. But most importantly, people still matter. My belief is simple, “Relationship Capital” is still the most important asset in private markets.”
“We’re not chasing IRR optics or headline deals. We’re building portfolios where patient capital can earn real, realized returns—2.0x+ money multiple. The thesis hasn’t evolved so much as it’s been proven, refined, and now—finally—met by market demand.”
Favorite Memory
What has been your favorite memory of leading Labyrinth Capital Partners so far? Lawrence reflected:
“First, it was having Tony and Cameron join me on this journey. I have worked with Cameron for over eight years, and he introduced Tony to the Labyrinth opportunity shortly after he joined in mid-2020. These two guys have been awesome and are experienced having both worked both in banking early in their careers and now acting as principal investors. We are all entrepreneurs, and I believe it is a testament to their own belief that what we are doing at Labyrinth is very compelling for the long term despite the market headwinds we have faced over the last few years. It’s not easy to do what we do, but I am glad they are alongside me as we look to build this firm.”
“One of my favorite memories at Labyrinth was closing our very first deal—what we now call LCAS I—back in 2021.”
“It wasn’t the biggest transaction we’ve done, not by a long shot, but it meant everything at the time. We had just come out of a brutal stretch—launching the firm 45 days before COVID, trying to raise capital in a completely frozen market, dealing with a high-quality warehouse partner that unfortunately didn’t work out given our focus on money multiple versus their experience targeting IRR.”
“It would’ve been easy to fold. Instead, we pulled together a three-separate-transaction portfolio convincing a handful of real players—including two secondary firms and other prominent FO/HNWs, including a leading secondary industry advisor who is extremely well known globally as one of the best in the business, to back us.”
“That deal was scrappy, deeply structured, and 100% proprietary. It was the embodiment of what Labyrinth is about: doing the work, sourcing off the radar, and structuring around downside.”
“Seeing that close and getting validation from smart capital partners who believed in what we were building—that was the moment it all felt real. It wasn’t just a memory; it was the start of momentum.”
Significant Milestones
What have been some of your firm’s most significant milestones? Lawrence cited:
“Some of the most significant milestones for Labyrinth have come not just from the deals we’ve done, but from what we’ve had to overcome to get them done. Launching the firm in January 2020—just weeks before COVID—was trial by fire. The world shut down, capital froze, and we had no institutional backing. But by 2021, we closed our first deal, a three-transaction, four-company SPV that we sourced and structured ourselves, with backing from top-tier secondary investors like Commonfund and Willowridge. That was the turning point—it validated that Labyrinth was continuing on the strategy that was proven previously at my prior firm.”
“Another major milestone came in 2022, when we secured our anchor commitment from a very large U.S.-based family office. That wasn’t just a check—it was one of their first ever allocations outside the family business and into private markets, and they followed up with another $30 million in a sidecar co-investment. Convincing an investment team of that caliber, with that level of conservatism, to back us based purely on strategy and execution was a huge vote of confidence.”
“From there, we kept building. We now have 13 companies across 10 structured transactions, all proprietary or with limited competition, and with an average age of just two years. Along the way, we’ve built out a pipeline that’s generated several billion dollars of actionable deal flow in 2024 alone, and we’ve proven that we can consistently buy quality assets at significant discounts to their fair value. But maybe the biggest milestone is less tangible: we’ve stayed true to the thesis, and we’ve built a reputation for doing the hard work in a part of the market most people ignore. That’s what makes this firm different—and durable.”
Investment Success Stories
When asking Lawrence whether he could share any investment success stories, he highlighted:
“Absolutely—one that stands out is Project Cell. It was a classic Labyrinth deal: messy on the surface, highly compelling underneath. We sourced it directly from a general partner from a VC firm who was the only institutional investor in a high-performing digestive health company. The fund was shutting down for administrative reasons, and the LPs needed liquidity. Most groups passed because the optics were tough—end-of-life VC fund, limited information, but we dug in given I had known the partners for over five years and kept in contact with them on all of their portfolio companies.”
“What we found was a company—Enzymedica—that was a market leader in enzyme-based supplements with real cash flow, zero leverage, and strong growth in a $50B+ and expanding global TAM. The kicker? We acquired it at a great price and structured a continuation vehicle with the general partners, brought in two institutional co-investors, and locked in attractive, off-market terms with strong governance and alignment.”
“We have a high degree of confidence in the management team, general partner and the overall structure that should get us to our stated objective of a 2.0x+ net return to our investors. This is a real business, growing, profitable, solid balance sheet with downside protection already baked into the structure. That’s the model: proprietary sourcing, real diligence, thoughtful structuring, and letting time and cash flow do the work. Project Cell is the kind of deal that proves the GP-led+ model works—and that we know how to execute it.”
AUM And Other Metrics
Can you discuss total AUM or any other notable metrics? Lawrence revealed:
“As of Q3 2024, Labyrinth Capital manages over $100 million in assets across 10 investments representing 13 underlying companies. That figure includes our flagship vehicles—LCAS I, II, and our SMA —as well as several bespoke SPVs like Project Armor and Project Flag.”
“Importantly, all of that capital was raised during one of the toughest fundraising markets in recent memory.”
“Our portfolio is young—average hold just over 24 months—but we’re already showing meaningful traction. Current TVPI is ~1.3X across the board, with multiple individual deals pacing well above that sitting at 2.0x+. However, I am keenly aware that the scoreboard doesn’t lie, so getting this portfolio to liquidity over the coming years is a top priority obviously.”
“In terms of enterprise value creation, we’re backing real companies with real growth. Collectively, the underlying businesses in our portfolio generate over a billion dollars in revenue, many with low leverage and strong free cash flow. We’ve structured each transaction to prioritize downside protection—through pricing, governance, and terms—while still capturing meaningful upside.”
“The broader story is this: over the past four years, we’ve reviewed more than $20 billion in actionable deal flow, sourced 100% of our completed investments through proprietary or limited-competition channels, and executed on deals where we’ve consistently purchased at discounts to fair value. The returns are solid, but the process behind them—sourcing, structuring, and selectivity—is what drives the durability.”
Industry Focus
What are some of the industries that Labyrinth is focused on? Lawrence noted:
“Labyrinth doesn’t lead with industry as a filter—we lead with structure, alignment, and pricing—but over time, certain sectors have become recurring themes because they fit our model: cash-generative, growing, and overlooked by the mega-funds. We’ve built a track record across healthcare, software, business services, consumer discretionary, and manufacturing/industrial.”
“Healthcare has been a natural fit. We’ve backed companies in healthcare IT, digestive health, and home health services—businesses with recurring revenue and real cash flow, but often stuck in end-of-life funds or sponsor-owned platforms with misaligned LPs.”
“In software, we’ve done multiple structured equity deals in supply chain and cybersecurity, where we’ve created ‘top-of-the-stack’ positions in high-growth companies without chasing frothy valuations. Business services has been another area of strength, especially in carveouts or insider-led recap situations where we can get attractive entry points and strong downside protection.”
“We’ve also leaned into consumer discretionary—particularly in franchising and specialty retail—where unit economics are strong and we can support growth with primary capital. And on the communications side, we’ve backed legacy assets with stable EBITDA and natural monopolies in regional markets.”
“Fundamentally, we stay away from turnarounds, early VC stage businesses where the chance of a binary outcome could be real. Credit secondaries are less likely for us given they are more IRR plays than money multiple. On the other side of the spectrum, we don’t look to invest in real estate or infrastructure given our hold period is two to five years and these typically are held much longer.”
“But again, it’s not about sector specialization. We’re opportunistic within our market segment as a part of our portfolio construction strategy. We want diversity by industry and by the number of companies that, when done correctly, offer investors additional downside protection. If there’s mispricing, insider alignment, and a structure that protects capital while capturing upside—we’ll look hard but be very cognizant of the point in time where some industries may have either headwinds or tailwinds.”
Differentiation From Other Firms
What differentiates Labyrinth from other firms? Lawrence emphasized:
“What sets Labyrinth apart is simple: we have done this before and not just in the U.S. At my prior firm, we did these same transactions globally in the same target market. We have much more experience than other players. We are investors and not asset allocators. A clear divide has emerged between firms that lead and structure deals with strategic expertise and those that merely follow; Labyrinth stands firmly as a lead investor, not a follower, in our target market. We haven’t and probably won’t commit to the larger GP-Led deals you see in the press unless we have an information asymmetry angle that justifies it. Importantly, our target market includes BOTH private equity companies and those that are not backed by private equity investors. We executed on one such deal already here at Labyrinth where a family member of a long-standing business was seeking liquidity.”
“We are good listeners. Not all deals are clean from the start and sometimes you need to create an opportunity with many levers. This is important when you make sure the liquidity solution works for ALL parties involved.”
”As stated earlier, we focus exclusively on what we call GP-led+—deeply structured, special situation secondaries in the $5 million to $50 million range. These typically aren’t intermediated billion-dollar continuation vehicles. These are sometimes hairy, complex transactions: end-of-life funds with a few remaining assets, insider strip sales, hybrid deals where we’re providing liquidity and primary capital simultaneously. We are focused on proprietary or limited competition deals that are structured to protect downside and enhance upside—through preferred terms, governance rights, pricing discounts, and real alignment with management and GPs.”
“We also run lean and deep. We’re not a 30-person team looking to deploy a billion dollars a year. We chase a handful of deals annually, and by knowing the people and assets better—through direct access, rigorous diligence, and tactical structuring.”
“At the end of the day, what truly differentiates Labyrinth is that this isn’t a volume game or a résumé contest—it’s a work game. We’re not asset gatherers. We’re investors. We win with sourcing, structure, and discipline in a corner of the market that most of our peers don’t even see.”
Future Goals
What are some of Labyrinth’s future goals? Lawrence pointed out:
“Labyrinth’s future goals are clear—and grounded in conviction. We’re not trying to build a mega-platform or chase headlines. We’re focused on scaling the strategy we know works: deeply structured, special situation secondaries in the underserved $5 million to $50 million range. The immediate goal is to launch our next institutional fund backed by a few strategic anchor LPs who understand our edge and value the work we do at this end of the market. To be clear, this can be much larger, but we need to grow back into the deployment level of $200 million per year like I had at my prior firm.”
“We want to formalize and scale our GP-Led+ model—continuation vehicles, strip sales, restructurings, direct secondaries, and hybrids—while keeping the portfolio concentrated and high-conviction. That means staying disciplined: focus on proprietary or limited competition, with disciplined downside protection baked into the structure. We want to keep winning by knowing the people involved and the assets under a structure that is clear and provides the necessary transparency as we do NOT want to be on the board of the underlying companies. Our portfolio construction demands that we focus on many companies, and I am firm believer that sitting on boards will take time away from this objective. Moreover, there are always smarter people to help steward the operations of a company, and while I want the top of stack security that may come with a board seat, I would rather someone else have that chair while Tony, Cameron and I focus on building a high-quality portfolio.”
“Longer term, I want to get back to what we know works on a global scale. That includes expanding our sourcing reach—especially in Europe and select parts of Asia—and potentially partnering with other specialist managers who share our ethos and can plug into our infrastructure. But whatever growth looks like, it’ll be grounded in the same principles: people, price, structure, alignment, and real work. We’re not in this to be the biggest—we’re here to be the sharpest.”
Additional Topics
Any other topics you would like to discuss? Lawrence concluded:
“One thing I always like to emphasize—because it gets lost in the noise—is how broken or misused the current ‘secondaries’ market definition is for investors.”
“The term ‘secondaries’ no longer can be applied to only one type of return. Historically, LP-Led was what investors commonly understood as the investment opportunity that provided good downside protection, reasonably consistent cashflow, and a mid-teens IRR return. No longer can people think like that as today there are LP-Led, GP-Led, credit, infrastructure, GP stakes, VC only directs, and real estate secondary strategies in the market. ALL of these have different risk/return profiles. I hear often that an investor already has their secondary manager in the portfolio and don’t need any more exposure.”
“I respond sometimes by saying ‘wake up,’ the secondary market has evolved and is inventing new and compelling strategies that are not all correlated and may provide a more interesting/attractive risk/return. For example, a single asset only GP-Led firms’ portfolio in theory should provide a shorter duration, less risky return given the historical visibility into the GP and the company’s performance when compared to a typical Co-Investment only fund where an investment thesis and the performance of each investment will be tougher to predict.”
“Another area that warrants some further discussion is the bifurcation between large and small funds and the advantages of each versus the mid-market players. Some of this has been covered in PE for some time, but in Labyrinth’s target market we don’t think it gets talked about enough by investors. Currently, the bulk of GP-led volume is now controlled by a handful of mega-funds and intermediaries that dominate the terms, pricing and structure in the larger deals with smaller firms rounding out the syndicate. Some would argue that is beta in disguise, but another question for investors is to make sure they are paying fees commensurate with the performance by managers that lead/price/structure versus those that are simply asset allocating to the deal in syndication. Labyrinth’s market has relatively few players doing GP-Led+ whereby most of our deals are led by us or, on a few occasions, have another co-lead.”
“Simply put, we are very excited about our target market having been focused on this niche for over 15 years globally. The secondary market and some of the managers are providing new and interesting strategies for investors to consider. We obviously think Labyrinth is on to something too…”
